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STS-51 PAD ABORT FINAL REPORT
- INTRODUCTION -
The STS-51 initial launch attempt of Discovery (OV-103)was terminated on KSC launch
pad 39B August 12, 1993 at 9:12 AM E.S.T. due to a sensor redundancy failure in the
liquid hydrogen system of ME-2 (Engine 2033). The event description and timeline are
summarized in Table 1.
Propellant loading was initiated on 12 August, 1993 at 12:00 AM EST. All SSME chill
parameters and Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) were nominal. At engine start plus 1.34
seconds a Failure Identification (FID) was posted against Engine 2033 for exceeding the
1800 gpm intra-channel (A1-A2) Fuel Flowrate sensor channel qualification limit. The
engine was shut down at 1.50 seconds followed by Engines 2032 and 2030. All shut
down sequences were nominal and the mission was safely aborted. Figure 1 depicts the
Fuel Flowrate sensor channel disqualification and Figure 2 depicts the abort
profile/overlay for all three engines.
SSME Avionics hardware and software performed nominally during the incident. A review
of vehicle data table (VDT) data and controller software logic revealed no failure
indications other than the single FID 111-101, Fuel Flowrate Intra-Channel Test Channel
A disqualification, Figure 3. Software logic was executed according to requirements and
there was no anomalous controller software operation, Table 2.
Immediately following the abort, a Rocketdyne/NASA failure investigation team was
assembled, (Table 3). The team successfully isolated the failure cause to an open circuit
in a Fuel Flowrate Sensor. This type of failure has occurred eight previous times in
ground testing. The sensor had performed acceptably on three previous flights of the
engine and SSME flight history shows 684 combined fuel flowrate sensor channel flights
without failure.
The disqualification of an Engine 2 (SSME No. 2033) Fuel Flowrate sensor channel was
a result of an instrumentation failure and not engine performance. All other engine
operations were nominal. This disqualification resulted in an engine shutdown and safe
sequential shutdown of all three engines prior to ignition of the solid boosters.
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STS-51 ON-PAD ABORT
TEAM FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Tables 1 and 2 summarize key recommendation in response to the investigation findings
as related to the sensor. Hotfire testing should be expedited on the current redesigned
(new potting material) sensor in parallel to initiating production fabrication for incorporation
into the fleet. Close attention to production implementation coupled with successful
hotfire test results could support fleet implementation next spring.
Table 3 summarizes key recommendations in response to the investigation findings as
related to the software. Table 4 addresses generic issues brought to light during the
investigation.
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FAILURE TREE ANALYSIS/FAILURE SCENARIO
FAULT TREE
The fault tree for the STS-51 fuel flow sensor intra-channel check limit violation is
shown in Figure 1. The tree is divided into the major branches which distinguish two
possible failure modes, 1) a flowmeter mechanical failure preventing required stimulus
of the flow sensor and no sensor output, Figure 2, or 2) an electrical failure preventing
proper sensor output to the controller or proper output processing by the controller and
attendant software, Figure 3.
A third major branch considered was a failure producing fuel flow levels (meter thru
flow) below the sensible range of the flow sensor. This was immediately eliminated as
a credible failure in-as-much-as all engine and hydrogen pump performance
parameters were normal and three of the four flow sensory coil outputs were normal,
indicating normal meter thru flow rates.
The tree identifies all components that could have contributed to failure in these major
branches and then specific failure modes in each component. Components were
eliminated or confirmed as failure candidates by post abort testing, data review,
hardware removal with special test and disassembly and system data analysis.
Shaded boxes in Figure 1 depict failure modes and failure components not
contributing to the flow sensor limit violation. The unshaded boxes in Figure 1 depict
the most probable failure path(s) leading to the sensor output violation. The fuel flow
sensor coil A lead wire was identified as the failed component via special tests at the
supplier and subsequent sensor disassembly observed by the Rocketdyne and NASA
failure team personnel (see sections 4.0). The component failure is the probable
result of a generic design deficiency in the application thermal environment but may
have been influenced by workmanship factors resulting from a five year break in
production fabrication of this component.
The following discussion delineates the specific facts and factors leading to the
elimination of the shaded boxes in Figure 1.
Mechanical Failure
Mechanical failure would cause erroneous output due to slowing or stoppage of the
flow meter rotating parts. This could be caused by contamination, bearing failure, or
rotor blade failure.
v
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Flow Rotor Failed To Tum or Blade Failure
The flow meter mechanical system was found to be operating correctly as indicated by
three of the four flow sensing coils, Figure 4.
Electrical Failure
Electrical failure divides into three possibilities: Controller, Sensor, or Harness, Figure
3.
No problems were observed during the trouble-shooting with any of the electrical
components post abort (PR2033-0142). The controller was used to perform numerous
sensor checkouts. These were done while moving the harness and connector. As
part of the trouble-shooting the connector at the sensor was removed and the
controller correctly identified the sensor was not installed. A different sensor was
installed and again the checkouts were normal, and no failure was indicated using a
good sensor.
;.. ..
Controller
The controller branch includes software and hardware.
program which was loaded into the computer memory.
functions are considered to be hardware.
Software is the executable
All other controller related
The controller and software were found to be operating correctly post abort with no
problems identified during any of the checkouts.
Software
The software used in controller U/N F42 (ME-2) was the same as that used for ME-1
& 3 controllers for this flight. The software was verified at the Huntsville Software Lab
prior to delivery to Kennedy Space Center and is functionally identical to that used in
the other controllers. The data review post abort verified the response to the input
data was correct and there were no self checking parity errors indicating memory
upsets.
r_
\
v
Controller Hardware
This branch includes electronics and wiring. Electronics are the electronic
components not including the wiring. Wiring is considered to be the wires connecting
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the electronic components within the controller.
The controller was used to do the initial trouble-shooting of the sensor and harness by
running sensor checkouts after the abort and operated normally (IPR2033-0142).
Although this gave some confidence that the controller was good, the controller was
removed and sent to Honeywell for further testing.
v
Controller Electronics & Wiring
The following tests were conducted at Honeywell to further eliminate controller U/N
F42 as a potential cause for the sensor output failure:
O Baseline Functional Testing
Continuity check of sensor input circuit
Pulse Rate counter check-out
Environmental testing while performing functional tests-
Cold start thermal cycle and two high voltage thermal cycles
Vibration testing in each of three axis: 10 minutes @ 3.5 Gs, 3
minutes @ 7 Gs, 10 additional minutes @ 3.5 Gs (Total of 69 minutes
of vibration testing)
• Acceptance Functional Testing
During all of the testing the controller performed to specification. All testing was
performed while monitoring the fuel flow circuits for overvoltage which could damage a
flow coil - no anomalies were detected.
The results for these tests are documented in Honeywell Customer Engineering Letter
Number 3-SSEC-2332 (see appendix).
Controller Induced (Failure rOf The, Sensor)
A circuit analysis was conducted to determine if the controller could produce a .failure
in the sensor. The minimum current required to fuse the sensor coil wire is 500
mAMPSo The worst case direct short to the coil would be a maximum of 80 mAMPS
at minimum temperature. This is a short between the Logic Supply Voltage through
the Pulse Rate Converter o-. the 1E3 card to the sensor coil.
The sensor checkout circuit was reviewed and since the sensor A2 coil is isolated
electrically from the checkout voltage it was eliminated as a possible cause, Figure 5.
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The connector is considered to be the mechanical source which connects to the
adjoining components and the connection wire.
Connectors
The connectors were visually inspected and no evidence of mechanical damage was
noted (Figure 6). Once demated no evidence was noted of bent or broken pins.
During sensor checkout post abort the connectors were wiggle checked with no
problems (IPR2033-0142).
The connectors were disconnected and the standard post installation checkouts
(continuity and insulation resistance) were performed with no problems. This testing is
documented in KSC TPS 2033-050.
,u
Banless Wire
The wire harness was visually inspected and no evidence of mechanical damage was
noted. The harness was wiggle checked during sensor checkout post abort with no
problems (IPR2033-0142).
The harness was disconnected and the standard post installation checkouts (continuity
and insulation resistance) were performed with no problems. This testing is
documented in KSC TPS 2033-050.
Sensor
Failure modes were divided into magnet and wire
Sensor Maqnet
The magnet was eliminated since the A1 coil which is coincident with the failed coil
was providing a normal signal. This is documented in the FUEL FLOW A1 & A2
FLT051A1 data plot. Furthermore, subsequent sensor diagnostic and disassembly
revealed no magnet anomalies.
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Sensor wire
During testing at Rosemount the wire in the A2 side of the sensor was verified to
make contact at ambient conditions but would be open when chilled. This is
consistent with the failure (Figure 7). The final analysis identified that potting
compound cracks were the reason for the failure which can be considered a design
deficiency. Workmanship problems were also identified which could have contributed
to the early failure, This will be documented in Rocketdyne UCR/FAR A032605 and
Rosemount disassemble report D9330225.
Summary
All possible causes for the fuel flow sensor output disqualification failure have been
identified and addressed in the fault tree. The systematic failure investigation results
have concluded that an open circuit broken A-2 coil wire resulting in no A-2 coil output
at operating conditions was the direct cause of the identified failure.
Based on the evidence completed in the investigation and application of the fault tree
logic the most probable failure scenario is summarized in Figure 8.
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Flow Sensor Failure Analysis
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TRANSDUCER FAILURE ANALYSIS
SUPPLIER "AS RECEIVED" INSPECTION
The transducer was hand carried to Rosemount, Inc. in Eagan, MN by Kelly Geroux
and Brian Luther of KSC. The failure analysis was directed by Emesto Acosta
(Avionics) and Jeff Fink (ME&T) from Rocketdyne and Wesley Thompson (S&E
Instrumentation) and Rob Lamdon (Materials) from NASA MSFC. The hardware
evaluation began on 16 August 1993. No abnormalities were noted during the visual
inspection of the external surfaces of the part. The probe tip and electrical connector
exhibited no evidence of damage.
ELECTRICAL FUNCTIONAL CHECKS
The initial testing of the unit was restricted to non-environmental conditions so as to
minimize the chance of introducing a fault not originally present. The test parameters
match those used during the original production acceptance testing (except in the
case of x-ray which is not required). The tests included coil impedance (resistance
and inductance), output calibration, simulated output, insulation resistance, dielectric
withstanding voltage, and isolation resistance. The resulting data was compared wit
the corresponding original build values. The two coils exhibited similar characteristics.
All parameters repeated within normal limits and are tabulated below:
_:9il #1 Coil #2
Test Un_= Cu==nt O_a. ATP _(__ Cu_ent O_. ATP AL_
Resistance Ohms 1282.43 1268.73 +1.1 1285.41 1271.41 +1.1
Inductance Henries 0.169 0.169 0 0.169 0.169 0
Output _lOOHz Volts AC 1.03 0.975
Output Q2OOHz Volts AC 2.10 2.08
Output Q3OOHz Voh AC 3.20 3.20
Output (_400Hz Volts AC 4.40 4.50
Output Q50OHz Volts AC 5.70 5.60
Simulated output Volts AC n/a nla
IR Megohma 28K 30K
DWV Microamps <100 <100
Coil Isolation
+5.6 1.05 1.00 +5.0
+1.0 2.15 2.10 +2.4
0 3.22 • 3.25 -1.0
-2.2 4.50 4.55 -1.1
+1.8 5.80 5.70 +1.8
n/e 7.67(1) 3.72 n/a
-6.7 28K 3OK -6,7
0 <100 <100 0
Megohms n/a n/a n/a >100
(1) Operator error resulted in incorrect frequency (5kHz instead of 500 Hz)
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In addition, the part Fig. 1 was subjected to real time micro-focus x-ray examination as
a non-destructive technique for assessing evidence of internal anomalies. The
32AWG wires were clearly visible, however, the individual 45AWG coil wires were not
apparent. A "spiral like" feature observed on the x-ray image, but within the coil below
the potted lead wire area, could not be positively identified as a potting crack or
correlated to any coil feature.
ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING
The next phase of evaluation included those tests from the build and acceptance test
procedure with environmental extremes of temperature and vibration. The first
indication of a problem surfaced during the "Coil Isolation" test actually performed in
the preceding section. After chilling the unit and checking it electrically, the operator
swapped test leads and checked for continuity on both coils. Coil #2 was found open,
however, it was not known at what point the open actually occurred as the equipment
monitors only the coil to coil isolation. The fact that the open circuit was reproduced
using the thermal cycle fixture suggested that a temperature chamber might provide
greater control over rate, thereby permitting detection of the actual conditions at which
the open occurs. During the chamber thermal cycling the continuity of both coils was
continuously monitored. Coil #2 opened during the first cycle in LN2 at approximately
25°C (coil resistance measured 1225£_ to 1227_).
Stray capacitance measurements were performed on the various connector leads in
an attempt to ascertain the location of the probable wire break. The resulting data is
tabulated below and the low relative capacitance (0.1nF) points to a open in the
vicinity of the pin #3 lead:
Pin Connections
Capacitance Values(nF)
Room Tempera..ture 14"C (Coil #2 Open)
1 - 3 22.3 0.1
2 - 3 26.2 0.1
2 - 4 22.4 22.4
1 - 4 26.2 26.2
Confirmation of a fault permitted the deletion of the remainder of the tests, including
vibration and extended thermal testing.
HARDWARE DISASSEMBLY
The disassembly of the unit was initiated on the evening of 16 August 1993. First, the
probe end cap was machined off. No obvious defects were evident. Next, the sheath
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over the coil area was machined partially through its thickness. Finally, the remaining
stainless sheath membrane was carefully peeled away revealing the potted coil pickup
assembly. A single axial crack was observed in the potting and continuity checks from
the electrical connector confirmed that the crack was over the Pin # 3 lead. The
appearance of the coil is illustrated in Fig. 2.
The part was resubmitted for micro-focus x-ray examination, however, removal of the
outer 321 stainless steel sheath did not significantly improve the viewing of the coil
details. Further visual examination disclosed that the surface crack intersected a void
in the potting, where the lead wire teflon insulation erupted through the surface Fig. 3.
The surface of the potting was examined with a Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM)
prior to being chemically stripping away. The crack appeared widest near the void in
the potting and its irregular path followed surface void or non-uniformities.
In addition, it should be noted that the potting appeared to have stratified, in that the
microballoon filler was concentrated on the side of the coil away from where the crack
was located. Electrical checks confirmed that machining away the sheath caused the
intermittent open to become a "hard" open.
Evaluation of the source of the open condition required that the Hysol PC12-007
potting material be removed in a manner so as to minimize manipulation of the coils
and lead wires. Mechanical methods were discounted. A solution of Eccostrip and
water was utilized to soften and dissolve the epoxy. Examination of the part after -2
hours in the solution revealed a suspected break in the coil wire. The part was
allowed to remain in the solution overnight. Visual examination resumed on 18
August. Continuity checks through the remainder of the coil verified that the coil itself
was intact. Microscopic examination disclosed that the break was located ~375 ° from
braze joint to 32 AWG lead wire (15 ° into second strain relief turn).
\ /
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Materials Analysis
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MATERIALS ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
A systematic examination and tear-down of the RES7005-061, SIN 2582 flow sensor
was conducted at Rosemount's a facilities in Eagen and Burnsville, Minnesota.
Material analysis of the sensor consisted of a preliminary Real-Time X-Ray
examination followed by removal of the sensor's end cap and sheath. Detailed visual,
Real-Time X-Ray and Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) examination uncovered
an axial crack in the epoxy coil potting. The epoxy was then chemically stripped to
reveal a fracture of a coil wire near its braze joint to the pin 3 lead wire. The fracture
occurred where the wire spanned the potting crack very near an area of exposed lead
wire insulation. Subsequent SEM examinations of both halves of the broken wire
suggested the fracture was caused by tensile overload. Two previous cases of failed
flow sensors were reexamined and determined to have been caused by tensile
overload of coil wires that spanned potting cracks.
RESULTS
Partial Examination
A preliminary Real-Time X-Ray examination of the sensor was conducted prior to
disassembly. Views of the coil area through the 321 stainless steel sheath clearly
showed the four 32 gage, 0.00942" stranded copper lead wires. However, the 45
gage, 0.00176" solid copper coil wires were not discernible near their braze joints,
presumably due to their small size and attenuation of x-rays through the sheath. In
addition, no unusual conditions were noted in the connections or wires in the
connector end of the sensor.
Partial Disassembly
The sensor end cap and sheath were removed by machining to expose the Hysol
PC12-007M, glass microballoon filled, epoxy coil potting. An axial crack was evident
in the epoxy (Figure 1 & 2) that was primarily collinear with the pin 3 lead wire. The
crack was inspected with a binocular microscope and found to extend virtually the
entire length of the potting, radiating in both directions from an area of exposed
insulation of the lead wire. The crack bottom was not visible. The exposed area of
violet-colored Teflon insulation was estimated from photographs to have maximum
dimensions of 0.033" by 0.015".
The coil area was reexamined through the epoxy by X-Ray methods. Each coil and
leacl wire was visible at its braze joint, but no wire fractures or other anomalous
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conditions were evident.
The epoxy crack was examined in the SEM and estimated to have a maximum width
of 0.002". Although primarily axial, the crack diverted slightly in direction to connect
surface imperfections in the epoxy. Neither the braze joint lead wire nor coil wire were
visible while viewing down into the interior of the crack. Figure 3 supports the
conclusion that the epoxy crack initiated around the perimeter of the island of exposed
wire insulation.
%",-_w-_"
Epoxy Removal
The epoxy potting was soaked overnight in dichloromethane to allow it to soften and
slough away. The softened potting was then gently removed and a coil wire fracture
was found approximately one and one half stress relief turns from the pin 3 lead wire
braze joint (figure 4). A binocular microscope examination of the braze area showed
no evidence of joint overheating. The wire fracture was situated directly below where
the potting crack had been, in the vicinity of the exposed wire insulation. One end of
the fractured wire was still attached to the braze joint, while its mating end was
suspended nearby, above the coil windings. The epoxy crack depth appeared to be
limited to the microballoon filled potting only and did not penetrate into the general
mass of windings. The epoxy was strongly adhered to both halves of the fractured
polyamide-insulated wire, making its complete removal difficult. Electrical tests
verified this fracture as the only one present in the sensor.
SEM Examination of Fracture
A detailed SEM examination of the fracture surfaces was attempted, but was made
difficult by epoxy residues that deposited on the fracture surfaces during stripping.
The fracture surfaces showed a semblance of dimpling which in figure 5 might suggest
a tensile overload failure mechanism. Repeated attempts to remove the residue for a
clearer examination of the fracture surfaces were unsuccessful.
Previous Flow Sensor Failures
Two previous flow sensor failures were reexamined at Rocketdyne to determine the
failure mode. One (SIN 1969) had a coil wire fracture near the lead to which it was
brazed: most failures of the sensor have been reported as similar. Another (SIN
2186) had a fractured _)i: wire in the general mass of windings, remote from the lead
connections. In both cases the fracture was verified by SEM examination as tensile
overload and occurred where the wire spanned a crack in the potting.
;,,..j
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Figure 1.
Figure 2.
Figure 3.
Figure 4.
Figure 5.
FIGURE CAPTIONS
Axial potting surface crack.
Axial potting crack found after sheath removal.
SEM image of exposed pin 3 lead wire insulation and epoxy crack.
Fractured coil wire and pin 3 lead wire after epoxy removal.
SEM image of coil wire fracture.
--......j
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RES7005-61 FLOW SENSOR, S/N 2582
EPOXY POTTING CRACK 6X
FIGURE 2
SSME 2033
RES7005-51 FLOW SENSOR, S/N 2582 SSME 2033
EXPOSED INSULATION & EPOXY CRACK 75X
FIGURE 3
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RES7005-61 FLOW SENSOR, S/N 2582
FRACTURED COIL WIRE 25X
FIGURE 4"
SSME 2033
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RES7005-51 FLOW SENSOR, S/N 2582
COIL WIRE FRACTURE SURFACE
FIGURE 5
SSME 2033
2600X
44
\.,._j
Section 6.0
Structural and Thermal Analysis
RSS-8912
6-1
RSS8012
12/17_3 45
STRUCTURAL AND THERMAL ANALYSIS
STRUCTU RAL ANALYSIS
Based on the results of the evaluation conducted, the functional failure of the sensor is
attributed to the structural failure of the outer sensor potting HYSOL epoxy layer. A
thermal stress induced crack in the outer layer of epoxy resulted in severing of the
wire embedded in that layer and connecting the sensor coil bundle to the lead wire.
The severing of the wire resulted in loss of electrical continuity causing a functional
failure of the sensor, Figure 1.
DESCRIPTION
Metallurgical evaluation of the failed sensor unit, subsequent to the aborted flight of
STS-51, revealed a crack in the HYSOL epoxy potting surrounding the composite
copper/epoxy coil. The epoxy potting contains the 7 strand, 32 AWG lead wire and
the 45 AWG wire connecting the lead wire to the coil bundle. The investigation also
showed that the 45 AWG wire connecting the coil bundle to the lead wire was severed
at the crack plane in the 0.040" thick external layer of epoxy potting.
Based on a comparison of the relative ductilities of the copper wire (approximately 20-
30%) and the surrounding HYSOL epoxy (1-3%) it can be concluded, without
consideration of any other properties of the two materials, that the only way a copper
wire embedded in the epoxy could fail is if the epoxy cracked. Additional conditions
for the wire to fail are that the epoxy crack plane crosses the wire and that the wire
cloes not debond from the epoxy as the epoxy cracks. Therefore the analytical effort
carried out to determine the cause of failure concentrated on:
1)determining if the stresses in the epoxy are sufficient to cause the epoxy to crack,
2)determining the width of the crack in the outer epoxy layer and whether the width is
sufficient to stretch the wire beyond its ductility limit and
3)determining whether the shear bond strength of the epoxy is sufficient to prevent the
wire from debonding.
Because of the large differences in the thermal expansion between the wire and the
epoxy, thermal stresses were suspected to be the most probable cause of the epoxy
crack and the investigation was directed toward quantifying these stresses and
determining whether the above three conditions for failure could be satisfied by
consideration of thermal stresses alone. Three finite element models were developed
to obtain quantitative results neede_ The three models, as they relate to the
composite construction of the sensor, are schematically illustrated in Figure 2.
The first model (Figure 3) is a three layered, pisegment, shell of revolution, of the pole
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piece, the coil and the epoxy potting. The model is based on the assumption of
generalized plane strain in the axial direction, requiring only a single layer of elements
in the axial direction. It was used to determine the nominal thermal stresses in the
epoxy potting at the minimum temperature the sensor is expected to see in service.
Only the stresses due to the differences in thermal expansion coefficients were
computed. The temperature gradients during the initial chilldown of the sensor were
found to be small and were neglected.
The second analytical model developed was a circumferential segment model of the
epoxy layer. This model is illustrated in Figure 4 of the Attachment. This model is
designed to quantify the amount of "gaping" that would result from stress relief that
would occur in the event the potting developed an axial crack.
The third and final model Figure 5 simulates a single strand of 45 AWG copper wire
imbedded in a semi-infinite field of epoxy. The purpose of this model is to quantify the
shear stress in the bond between the wire and the epoxy as a fraction of the tensile
stress of a 45 AWG copper wire imbedded in the epoxy and determine whether the
bond between the wire and the epoxy would fail before the tensile strength of the wire
was exceeded.
Results and Discussion
The nominal stresses in the outer epoxy layer were determined using both worst case
and best estimate material properties of the copper bundle and the outer composite
layer Figure 6. The calculated nominal stresses in the HYSOL epoxy, based on a
service temperature of-330 degree F, range between 4600 and 10600 psi (see
following thermal analysis). These stresses are equivalent to a tensile mechanical
strain between 0.5 and 1.0% and are sufficient to initiate a crack in the epoxy,
especially at the outer ligament of the teflon wound lead wire where there is an
additional stress/strain concentration. Both ductility data and thermal expansion
coefficient data for HYSOL are relatively "soft". However, best estimates of these
properties strongly support that the actual strain to ductility ratio is sufficient to cause
failure of the epoxy. There is substantial loss of epoxy ductility at cryogenic
temperatures and the predicted tensile strains, including the stress concentration
caused by the lead wire are in the 1% to 2% range. The most probable failure
scenario may be described as follows:
1. the crack initiates in the outer ligament of the lead wire and proceeds more
or less parallel to the lead wire,
2. if the 45 AWG wire connecting the core to the lead wire crosses the ::ack
plane and the wire does not debond from the epoxy, the wire fails,
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, if the 45 AWG wire connecting the core to the lead wire does not cross the
crack plane or in the event the wire debonds from the epoxy, the wire will
survive.
When the epoxy cracks, the wire has a probability of surviving or failing and failure
depends on the randomness of the progression of the crack and the details of the
core wire / lead wire attachment.
The results of the analysis carried out using the second of the three models shows
that, in the event an axial crack develops in the HYSOL outer layer, the crack width at
the outside diameter will approach 0.0002". Without wire debond, this crack is
certainly sufficient to cause the wire to sever, as this stretch must be absorbed over
an infinitesimal length of wire and produces almost infinite local strain.
The results of analysis of the last model show that the wire/epoxy bond shear stresses
are approximately 6% of the tensile stresses in the wire. Assuming a 30,000 psi
tensile strength in the wire, the maximum shear stresses in the bond will be
approximately 1800 psi. Based on the best available data for strength of the HYSOL
epoxy, the wire will fail before it debonds. Metallurgical evaluation of the severed wire
confirms this conclusion.
Clearly, there is extremely strong evidence that the epoxy will crack, that the wire will
not debond and that, in the event the crack plane crosses the wire, the wire will fail.
THERMAL ANALYSIS SUMMARY
It was determined with simplified calculations that the sensor reached virtually steady
state temperature within half an hour of the propellant drop, and that there is no
significant difference between a 2 hour ground test chilldown and a 9 hour prolonged
flight chilldown in terms of the degree of the cooling of the flow sensor. It was also
determined that the slow chilldown transient did not generate any significant thermal
gradient between the sensor housing and the sensor coil. Both results were later
verified with a more detailed 2D model of the sensor, the instrumentation port, and a
portion of the duct. This 2D model was also used to quantify additional chilling of the
sensor due to engine mainstage operation.
Sensor ChiUdown Simplified Calculations
The nomenclature used in the discussion is shown on the cross-sectional diagram of
the sensor and the duct port in Figure 7.
A series of single node lumped capacitance calculations were carried out. It was
v
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recognized that the heat transfer is driven primarily by the boiling hydrogen in the
duct, and that there is comparatively little effect from the ambient environment since
both the sensor and the sensor port are insulated with rigid polyurethane foam.
Therefore, the simplest and quickest approach was to calculate the port chilling due to
the boiling hydrogen first, and then use the result from it to calculate the sensor flange
and housing chilling, and the result from this second step to drive the sensor coil
chilling.
The cooldown of the sensor port metal mass was calculated by using an average
boiling hydrogen film coefficient of 20 Btus/hr-ftL'R from Seader et. al. [1], and a
constant fluid temperature of 40°R. An' equivalent conductance of 0.32 Btu/hr-ftL°R
was used for the polyurethane insulation in series with the free convection heating
from the ambient or engine compartment environment, assumed to be at a steady
temperature of 460°R. The lumped capacitance approach is justified by a Biot number
of 0.15 based on the boiling heat transfer film coefficient and a volume to surface area
ratio of 0.6 inch.
Starting from an, initial temperature of 530°R, the port approaches a chilled steady-
state temperature of 59°R, with a temperature of 60.8°R achieved after only half an
hour of chill. A temperature versus time plot for the port is shown in Figure 7r_],
together with the sensor coil and housing which is discussed below.
The cooling of the sensor flange and housing was done in the second step, using the
calculated duct port transient temperature as the driver. The conductance across the
air gaps around the sensor tip was compared with the conduction through the
thickness of the sensor housing, and it was found that the latter was an order of
magnitude greater than the former. Most significant was the effective contact
conductance assumed between the port and sensor flanges, (Figure 7), which was
studied parametrically. Later, it became evident that a contact conductance value of
1500 Btus/hr-ftL°R is believed to be more reasonable, it can be concluded from Figure
8 that the flow sensor takes only slightly over half an hour of chill to reach steady
state.
The calculated sensor housing temperature was then used to drive the sensor coil.
As anticipated, the analysis showed that the temperature difference developed
between the housing and the coil is not significant due to the slow transient (Figures 8
and 9). This suggests that the ,T that is pertinent to the cracking of the molded
potting between the housing and coil is the overall slow change of the temperature
with time, and not the small gradients that develop between the sensor components
during the chilldown.
.. =
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2d Thermal Model
One assumption that was necessary in the simplified calculation described above was
to ignore the conduction from the sensor flange in the first step of calculating the duct
port chilldown. In the 2D model, the thermal contact between the sensor flange and
the port flange was properly accounted for, and its effect on the steady state
temperatures of the sensor tip and duct port was determined. In addition, a more
detailed temperature distribution was generated for the entire sensor. The 2D mesh is
shown in Figure 9 with descriptions of the boundary conditions. Since the flanges of
the sensor and the duct port are not fully solid in the circumferential direction, solidities
of 0.22 and 0.59 were applied to the elements of these respective components.
The baseline steady state result after a 2-hour chilldown is shown in the contour plot
in Figure 11. As mentioned earlier, a constant contact conductance of 1500 Btus/hr-
ft=-°R was used for the baseline case. There is a large temperature gradient that
occurs across the polyurethane insulation as expected, and a small axial gradient from
the connector end of the sensor to the tip where the coil is located. The large -T
across the insulation is consistent with almost no radial gradient across the sensor tip
(coil, potting, and housing), and the duct port.
Plots of nodal temperatures versus time for the baseline case are shown in Figure 12
for nodes located radially across the sensor tip and the duct port. The effect of having
the thermal contact between the sensor flange and the duct port throughout the
chilldown in the 2D model is obvious from this figure. With the heat transfer from the
sensor to the port properly accounted for in the 2D model, the duct port is predicted to
reach a higher steady state temperature of 85°R, compared to 59°R from the
simplified calculation, and the sensor steady state temperature is predicted to be lower
at 106°R, compared to the worst case 140°R predicted from the simplified calculation.
@ensor Chillinq Durinfl Mainstage Operation
The 2D model baseline case chilldown analysis was continued for 600 seconds of
104% RPL engine mainstage operation. The forced convection boundary condition in
the duct was changed from the boiling hydrogen film coefficient of 20 Btus/hr-ft2-'R
durir_g chilldown, to 4800 Btus/hr-ft=-°R during mainstage. In addition, a heat
generation rate of 0.073 Btu/hr was added at the coils, to represent the ohmic heat
loss generated by the flow sensor signal at mainstage.
The heat generation rate of 0.073 Btu/hr is too small to have any significance, and the
sensor coil chills further during mainstage. As shown in Figure 13, the port cools
down further from 85°R to 56°R, and the sensor also cools down further by 26°R, from
106°R to 80°R during mainstage. Overall, this means a sensor tip cooling of 530-R-
80°R = 450"R, from the start of chilldown to engine cutoff. This overall ,T based on
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estimate of 530°R-140°R = 390°R from the simplified calculation. However, since the
structural analysis ongoing at the time indicated that a .T= 300°R was sufficient to
cause cracking of the molded potting [4], the thermal refinements achieved with the 2D
model does not change the conclusion in relation to the cause of the sensor failure.
--,.,w_J
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SENSOR FAILURE CORRELATION
FUEL FLOW SENSOR FAILURE CORRELATION
Open circuit failure history for the flight configuration fuel flow sensor, part number
RES7005-051/061, is shown in Figure 1. Twelve sensors have failed out of a
population of 313 that were shipped by the manufacturer, Rosemount, Inc. These
parts were manufactured over a time span of 1978 to 1990 (Figure 2). The flow
sensors have failed on both flight and development engines and only the most recent
failure, serial number 2582, caused a launch abort.
Engine hot-fire experience on the failed parts (Figure 3) varies from infant mortality
failures due to electrical shorts in the pickup coils to a wide range of time (159 to
25,847 seconds) on sensors that failed due to open circuit. Of the twelve failures,
nine were the result of open circuits in the pickup coil and three were due to short
circuits in the coil. All but one of the open circuit failures occurred because of a break
in the 45 AWG magnet wire. Serial number 2004 failed open circuit due to a fatigue
failure in a 32 AWG, stranded leakwire. Of the sensors that received fractography on
the broken wires, three magnet wire breaks were attributed to ductile fractures and the
one leadwire was a fatigue failure isolated to a workmanship problem.
Beginning with the failure investigation of serial number 2010 in December 1987, the
pickup assemblies of failed flow and speed sensors were examined more closely for
proper strain relief in the coil wire to leadwire braze joint and for shaved insulation
where the leadwire extends into the potted pickup coil. Also, flow sensors built prior to
1980 as RES7005-051 parts received a series of rapid thermal shocks (from room
temperature to liquid nitrogen temperature) during the final assembly process. As a
result of the failure investigation on serial number 1474, sensors built after 1979 were
given gradual thermal cycles.
FAILURE CORRELATION ANALYSIS
The purpose of the Variable Correlation Analysis, performed as part of the Sensor
Failure History and Total Variable Summary, was to examine all the available lot
traceability data for indicators of sensor susceptibility to failure, and/or predictive
trends among the longest-surviving parts, in particular, the correlations identified
would be used to estimate the "level of confidence" for each of the existing hot-fire
assets (sensors which have been on an SSME during hot-fire testing).
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METHOD
First, a database was created from all the manufacturing and documentation
information available from Rosemount for all the fuel flow sensors of the present
design, which is represented in two dash numbers that differ only in the nature of the
thermal cycling tests performed for workmanship screening.
A graphical display of this data was achieved by making scatter plots of each
information field (y-axis) against sensor number (x-axis). Since Rosemount's lot data
were alpha-numeric, conversion to purely numeric data was required for analysis
purposes. The resulting "Lot Codes" (numbers) were displayed in new columns
beside the original lot designations. From the scatter plots, several observations were
made: 1. no one information field correlated strongly with even half of the failures
(i.e., the lots out of which the failed sensor came usually contained high-performing
sensors as well), 2. correlations were non-random (ioe., failures were not evenly
distributed among all lot numbers of all lot types), 3. the actual causes of the failures
(if deterministic at all) were likely to be indirectly related to several of the information
fields, 4. the causal factors are subtle enough that they could not be discerned by
viewing the scatter plots alone, 5. some information fields correlated more strongly
with failures than others. From this understanding of design and fabrication, the
twelve most important variables were chosen and ranked according to importance.
A more rigorous analysis was then undertaken, in which lot statistics for each lot type
(e.g. pickup assembly braze lot, final assembly inspection date, hysol lot) were
computed for each constituent lot number. A "high confidence lot" was postulated to
contain: 1. minimal failures (lot has good ratio of #non-failed units to #total units), 2.
maximal "experience" (units proven through much hot-fire time and many engine
starts/thermal cycles), and 3. large population (the more units in the lot, the greater
the confidence). Averages of the above quantities were computed for each lot in an
attempt to quantify the correlation between individual sensor lots (traceability
information including lot numbers and/or milestone dates) and the characteristic
success rate of each lot type (see appendix for detailed printouts of these statistics).
A quantitative scoring method was devised (using a multiplicative combination of the
above factors) to rate each lot number of each lot type on a discrete scale of +2, +1,
0, -1, -2.
From this lot rating information, the scores for each of the most important lots which
comprise a sensor's build history were displayed on a scoring matrix structured in an
analogous way to the original database. A total score was then computed for each
sensor from the "hot-fired" population. In particular, each sensor's total "risk
assessment score" is a weighted sum of its constituent lot scores, with the weights for
the lot types corresponding to their relative importances:
Sn = ___.,WiSi
Sn = total score for sensor #n
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Wi = weighing factor for variable "1" (e.g. P/A Braze Date)
si = score for lot of type "r' of which sensor "n" is a part (e.g. Lot T5)
This scoring method was then tested using a sensitivity analysis in which the weighing
factors were perturbed and observations made of the resulting split between the
averages for the failed sensor group and the highest experience group (each
containing a population of about a dozen). Also, the "failed set" was varied, with one
run including all 12 failed units in the analysis, another including only the 9 "coil open
circuit" failures in the analysis, and a third ( the best one) incorporating all but the one
failure which (based upon historical details) was considered to be causally unrelated to
the others. The summary statistics for this sensitivity analysis were displayed in
scatter plots of the averages ( and their associated standard deviations) vs. sensitivity
"case" number
RESULTS
The optimized model (using the chosen "failure set" and selected weighing factors)
was used to compute final "risk assessment" scores, which are presented in graphical
form (Figure 4).
Three categories were noted and defined for use in DAn's intended to make use of
the parts (181 hot-fire assets total) most likely to perform well:
° "BI" Parts -- Hiqh (Scores greater than zero).
Defined two "failed group" standard deviations above "failed group" average
score, or alternately, one "failed group" standard deviation above B2 group
average score; Group includes 108 functional parts.
Recommended use: flight.
. '132" Parts -- Medium (Scores > -21 and ___zero).
Defined one "failed group" standard deviation above B3 group average score
and one below B1, or alternately, above roughly one "non-failed group" st.
deviation of "non-failed" group average score; Group includes 35 functional
parts.
Recommended use: development test monitoring.
. "B3" Part3_ -- Low (Scores _<-21).
Defined as within one standard deviation of "failed group" average score
(which excludes S/N 1296); Group incles 26 functional parts.
Recommend use: non-flight d_-'__ channels,
--...j
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SCREENING RECOMMENDATIONS
For Flight Pumoses
1. Risk Assessment Score > zero.
2. Hot-Fire Starts between 5 and 100.
3. Hot-Fire Time between 1,000 and 25,000 sec.
For Development Purposes
1. Risk Assessment Score > -21,
MODEL SEN'SlTIVITY ANALYSIS AND OPTIMIZATION
Statistical Method Tested Through Variations of the "Failure Set"
A "blind run" which incorporated all 12 failed units in the analysis successfully flagged
the two units known by analysis history to be relatively unrelated to the other failures.
Two other runs compared a statistical model incorporating only the 9 "coil open circuit"
failures, with a model (the best one) which included all except the one failure (based"
upon historical details) considered to be the most causally unrelated to the others.
Among the models, the split between the averages of the failed set and the high-use
set was considered to be statistically significant in relation to the scatter in the data,
which indicated that the statistical approach could yield useful information about the
risk associated with each sensor.
,Statistical Method Tested and OPtimized ThrouQh SensiUvitv Analysis
Weighing factors for the variables were optimized from an initial baseline (derived from
Rocketdyne sensor engineering experience in conjunction with Rosemount design and
manufacturing experience) by testing over 250 different variations and running scores
each case.
Observations were made of the resulting statistics (averages, extreme, and standard
deviations) for various categories (failed sensors, moderate use sensors, and highest
experience sensors), and optimized weighing factors selected.
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SOFTWARE CHANGE
SOFTWARE CHANGE SUMMARY
_V
The SSME incorporates tw.__oseparate flow sensors on each engine. Each flow sensor
includes tw._.qpickup coils. All four pickup coils are used to compute an average
hydrogen fiowrate for use in mixture ratio control. The previous software monitored all
four coils on each engine (total of 12 per launch) against limits defining a "GOOD" or
"BAD" coil. Any identified "BAD" coil prior to launch caused disqualification of a
sensor coil pair (two coils) and a pad abort (STS-51 8/12193 attempt).
The new software provides a flow reference computation to which each of the four
coils can be compared such that "BAD coils can be disqualified one at a time. The
software permits one failed coil (on each engine) prior to launch without aborting the
launch, and the engine flies with three good coils.
The revised flow validation software was originally planned as part of a new software
block update called OI-6. It's inclusion in OI-6 was a result of a similar sensor failure
in ground test in July 1992. The software was defined for OI-6 in Jan. 1993 and in
verification at the Huntsville Simulation Lab (HSL) at MSFC since March 1993.
The software modification after the STS-51 abort merely lifts the OI-6 fl0w validation
change already in verification for four months as part of OI-6 and adapts it to OI-5
using the identical logic. Other non-related changes as part of OI-6 would not
complete verification until November 1993 and precluded its use.
The revised OI-5 software has been exposed to all software verification requirements,
1185 total test cases including all hypothesized failure modes. The new verification
requirements match a new software version but really represent a second verification,
the first as part of OI-6. In addition, an independent assessment and audit is being
performed by MSFC. Certification will include three engine hotflre tests on a minimum
of two engines before committing to flight. One of those tests will include operation of
the engine with a failed coil to verify the software response and subsequent engine
operation simulating pre liftoff operation. Post equivalent liftoff will include an artificial
failure in the controller to validate the software response to that failure.
SOFTWARE CHANGE DISCUSSION
The software in use during the STS-51 Pad Abort launch attempt was designated
RRS902M01AAAA24. This software is also referred to as OI-5 version AA24 for the
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vBlock II Controller and has been used on all flights since STS-52. The fuel flow
sensor qualification logic used in this version is the same as all prior Block II
Controller software versions. The requirements for this logic were derived from the
Block I Controller software requirements.
The AA24 fuel flow sensor qualification monitors are summarized in Figures 1 and 2.
The significant features of this version are the four different monitors that become
active at different times, the Inhibit (pre-start only) and resumable MCF responses for
the first failure, and the disqualification of sensors as pairs as well as individually. The
command from the Orbiter to shutdown on the pad originated from the MCF in the
failure response of the first fuel flow intra-channel failure prior to SRB ignition. This
test detected the output failure of sensor A2 when it differed from sensor A1 by more
than 1800 gpm for three consecutive updates.
Prior to the STS-51 pad abort, the potential for a fuel flow sensor failure was
recognized and a software change was already in work for the OI-6 software version
to red0ce the risk, (Figure 3). The logic change had already been designed,
developed, and validation tested at the Huntsville Simulation Laboratory (HSL) at
MSFC. It was scheduled for STS-62 in February 1994. The only remaining effort was
completion of testing at HSL for other changes contained in the OI-6 version and hot
fire certification testing at the Stennis Space Center.
One of the actions of the Pad Abort Investigation was to initiate modification of the
AA24 software to include the fuel flow sensor qualification logic in the OI-6. All of the
requirement change, design, development, software test and hot fire test activities
were performed on a priority basis to produce a new OI-5 software version designated
RRS902M01AAAA35 (AA35). The ECP for this change was approved and all required
lab and hot fire verification testing was successfully completed including a coil failure
simulation and power bus failure in hot fire, (Figure 4).
The purpose of the fuel flow sensor logic change is to better utilize the redundancy of
the four available flow sensors. The concept is to qualify the sensors individually
instead of in pairs and raise the failure responses up to the next redundancy element.
The result of this change allows liftoff if at least 3 of the 4 sensors are functioning.
The AA35 fuel flow qualification monitors are summarized in Figures 5 and 6. The
significant differences from the previous version are the deletion of the intra-channel,
inter-channel, and sensor reasonableness tests, the addition of a calculated reference
flowrate value (Qref) for comparison with the individual sensors, and the elimination of
the Inhibit and MCF responses for the first failure of either the sensor qualification test
or the Pulse Rate Converter (PRC) update test. If this software had been in use when
the STS-51 _d abort occurred, the failure of the flow sensor would have been
detected and reported by the PRC update test at about 3.0 seconds after engine start
but because of no MCF in the failure response, no shutdown would have been
commanded. The mission would have continued normally with the three remaining
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.good sensors.
The modified OI-5 software version AA35 allows launch with one fuel flowmeter
sensor channel failure during engine start. This logic change also modifies the
qualification method of the flow sensor channels prestart. Instead of comparing the
intrachannel (A1, A2 or B1, B2) to be within 1800 gpm, the individual sensor channels
are qualified to Q reference and must be within 0 and 1800 gpm. Failure of the first
channel prestart will cause the controller to issue a report only FID, a MCF is posted
for the second sensor channel failure. Since a report only FID is not visible to the
GPC or ground system computers, a preplanned contingency procedure for launch
commit criteria (SSME-29) was established for STS-51.
This procedure monitors the fuel flow sensor channels manually. If the report only FID
is posted during prelaunch conditioning prior to engine start and is caused by actual
fuel flowmeter motion as a result of tanking or MPS operations, then a controller reset
can be issued to clear the FID and proceed with the countdown for launch. It is also
noted in the procedures that a controller reset will cause the engine bleed valves to
close, therefore requiring a 60 minutes of continuous bleed flow prior to engine start to
maintain a proper start sequence. The countdown is to be scrubbed if the FID is
reported and is not related to the LH2 system because the failure implies an
electronics malfunction within the controller circuitry, (Figure 7). A FID occurring
between APU start and T-31 seconds will result in a launch scrub condition since
there is insufficient time for discussion. This procedure was accepted by the Shuttle
management team for STS-51 based on the relative MTBF's described in Figure 8.
Because of the possibility of false failure indications, an examination of the flow
measurement system failure modes was made to determine the possible meanings of
pre-launch failure indications. It was found in the nominal no-flow pre-launch
conditions that sensor and harness failures are not detectable. The only detectable
hardware failure is an intermittent failure in the controller PRC electronics. It was also
found that propellant system operations during the pre-launch period could create
false failure indications.
In order for the software to distinguish between these failure indications and reject the
false ones, it is assumed that a qualification failure is not a PRC failure unless the
failure is persistent. If the failure is not persistent, sensor qualification strikes are
cleared and no failure will be reported. This logic was included in the AA37 software
because it minimizes the possibility of reporting false failures and the need to perform
a controller reset in order to restore a falsely disqualified sensor.
A revision to modify the software response to a resumable MCF for the first fuel flow
sensor failure prior to engine start is planned for the su_ __quent flights. This will allow
the ground system computers to monitor for the MCF automatically and eliminate the
need for a manual monitoring of the launch commit criteria.
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Section 9.0
MTBF Comparison
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MTBF COMPARISON
FAILURE PROBABIUTY (MTBF) IMPACT
Table 1 depicts the gain associated with the software modification. By allowing liftoff
with one of four sensors failed per engine the pad abort MTBF (best estimate)
increases from one in 92 flights (using all nine experienced failures) to one in 67,000
flights.
With the revised software, liftoff can occur with one sensor already failed. The vehicle
is then one failure away from Electrical Lockup because subsequent failure of the
cross channel Input Electronics would disqualify two more flow sensors. An
assessment of the probability of Electrical Lockup was performed to determine the
severity of this concern. Failure probabilities for the orbiter electrical power buses as
well as each engine controller must be considered Figure 1. One power bus failure
affects two separate engine controllers via their respective input electronics which in
turn affects two flow sensor coils each. One power bus failure will result in four flow
coil failures.
The results of this study are presented in Table 2 and indicates the overall risk of
Electrical Lockup increases from 1 in 827,000 flights to 1 in 536,000 flights. It was the
opinion of the SASCB that the reduced pad abort risk outweighed the increase in the
risk of Electrical Lockup after liftoff. This opinion provided the rationale for approval of
the AA35 software.
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HAZARDS I FMEA CIL IMPACT
Disqualification of two fuel flow sensor channels during start is addressed as a cause
for vehicle commanded shutdown due to an MCF. This is documented in hazard
report ME-G6A (Abnormal Thrust Loads) paragraph 2B1. Failure of both sensors
(A&B) or one sensor channel (during prestart, start, or mainstage) and the cross-
channel IE during mainstage are covered as causes for electrical Iockup. This is
documented in hazard report ME-G4M (Loss of Thrust) paragraph 2B.
The software logic changes enhance safety risk by greatly reducing the probability of a
pad abort while maintaining a very low probability of attaining electrical Iockup during
mainstage.
The FMENCIL has been updated to show the software related/engine effects of the
revised software logic. No additional failure modes were identified as a result of the
software change (Figure 1). These are reflected in the controller, harness and sensor
FMENCILS. The effects of these failure modes are already covered in Hazard
Reports ME-G6A and ME-G4M. There is no impact to the hazard analysis.
Intermittent fuel flow electrical output signals, resulting in off-nominal mixture ratio
operation, are also identified as criticality 1R failure modes in the FMENCIL(s). The
effects of these failure modes are already covered in Hazard Reports ME-G6A and
ME-G4M as "erroneous redline shutdown".
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NASA LEVEL-I AND STS-51 L-2 CLOSEOUT BRIEFING
The results of the team investigation were presented by Byron Wood to the NASA
Level I PRCB via telecon on 8/24/93 and to the Mission Management Team (STS-51
L-2 Day) on 9110/93 at KSC. The investigation findings and rationale to fly STS-51
(OV103) were included in the presentation.
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Honeywell
Space Systems Division
Honeywell Inc.
13350 U.S. Highway 19 North
Clearwater, Florida 34624-7290
813 539-3273
813 539-3347 Fax
09 September 1993
CEL-K-472-1108
Rockwell International Corporation
Rocketdyne Division
6633 Canoga Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91303
Attention: Mr. R. E. Bartley
Subject: SSMEC DEPOT P.O. R90SPA89550074
Customer Engineering Letter - 3-SSEC-2332
F42 HEALTH CHECK
Gentlemen:
Under separate cover, we have forwarded four (4) copies of the subject CEL, in
response to the above reference, to Mr. R. Precourt, one (1) copy to Mr. G. Brown
and one (1) copy to Data Management.
Should you have any questions, please contact the undersigned at 813-539-3273.
Yours truly,
C.E. Lee
Contracts Specialist
CEL/mnr
co: R.A. Precourt - PAl9 (4)
G. Brown - PA05 (4)
Data Management- Rocked)me- AB16 (1)
T. McLeod - Rocketdyne Resident - 848..5 (2)(Internal)
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HONEYWELL
Avionics
Clearwater, Florida
C.E.L. NUMBER 3-SSEC-2332-Rev. A
9 September 1993
P_ge 1 of 4
Rockwell International
Rocketdyne Division
6633 Canoga Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91303
Attention: R.A. Precourt, Project Manager
Avionics Subcontracts/PA-19
Subject: F42 Health Check
T,. :
SUMMARY:
F42 completed all testing without incident on August 28, 1993. It was returned to
Honeywell for a health check on August 25, 1993. This unit had reported a Channel A
Q1A2 Flowrate failure which resulted in a launch abort. Health check included special
tests specifically designed and performed to verify the isolation and integrity of the
Q1A2 flow signal channel. Environmental exposure was performed with an
oscilloscope monitoring the Q1A2 flow signal channel at all times; this included three
thermal cycles (one cold start, two high voltage) and 69 minutes of vibration. Pre and
post environmental Automatic Test Equipment System (ATES) functional tests were
also performed. Worst case analysis determined that a short from an adjacent signal
path would result in a maximum current six times less than the current required to fuse
the Q1A2 flow sensor coil. Health check revealed no deficiencies in the performance
of F42. Analysis revealed no viable failure scenario which warrants any concern for
the integrity of F42.
CONCLUSION:
Since F42 experienced no failures during the STS 51 launch abort and based on the
successful completion of the health check, F42 was returned to Stennis Space Center
on September 2, 1993.
ANALYSIS:
Review of the internal controller wiring showed that the ±15V signal paths were the
highest regulated voltage sources adjacent to the QIA2 flow signal path. No
unregulated voltage sources are in the proximity of this path. It was then determined
by worst case analysis that the ±15V sources could supply no more than 79 mA if
shorted directly to the Q1A2 flow signal path. The resulting current is six times less
than the current required (500 mA) to fuse open the coil in the Q1A2 flow sensor
(based on a 190 _ coil resistance at cryogenic temperatures). At room temperatures
the resulting current (12.8 mA) from a short would be thirty-nine times less than the
fusing current of the Q1A2 flow sensor coil (1170 _ at room temperature).
160
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INVESTIGATION:
F42 was received on August 25, 1993. A visual inspection ("OK") and intemal
pressure check (8.5 psig) were performed. Routine cleaning of the controller and
connector mating surfaces was omitted, connector savers were installed. Electrical
bonding of Outboard Cover to chassis (0.06 m_) and Inboard Cover to chassis (0.05
m£) was verified. This completed incoming receiving inspection. No anomalies or
deficiencies were observed.
A baseline pre-environmental ATES functional test was performed without incident.
Flow signal channel data was reviewed and compared against data from previous
ATES functional tests (see Table 1). No discernible change in the test data was noted
in this comparison.
Flow signal Channel resistance was measured using a hand held Fluke as follows:
J107 A wrt B Fuel Flowmeter Ch A (Q1A1) PRI * 632_
J107 B wrt A Fuel Flowmeter Ch A (Q1A1) PRi * 587£_
J107. C wrt D Fuel Flowmeter Ch A (Q1A2) SEC 82.38 k_
J107 D wrt C Fuel Flowmeter Ch A (Q1A2) SEC 69.68 k_
J108 a wrt b Fuel Flowmeter Ch B (Q1B1) PRI 82.25 k_
J108 b wrt a Fuel Flowmeter Ch B (Q1B1) PRI 69.68 k.Q
J108 W wrt j Fuel Flowmeter Ch B (Q1B2) SEC * 592Q.
J108 j wrt W Fuel Flowmeter Ch B (Q1B2) SEC * 633_
(*500 Hz FET Switch. DG184 IE3)
A flight-type flow sensor (P/N 148AL, S/N 545) was connected as follows to perform
fault insertion test and thermal cycle testing of the Q1A1 and Q1A2 flow signal
channels.
Sensor Controller
Pin 1 J107 A
Pin 2 J 107 B
Pin 3 J 107 C
Pin 4 J 107 D
161
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Page 3 of 4
FAULT INSERTION:
Short J107 A to J107 B ,While
Short J107 C to J107 D While
Short J107 A to J107 B While
Short J107 C to J107 D While
Open J107 at A While
Open J107 at B While
Open J107 at C While
Open J107 at D While
Open J107 at A While
Open J107 at B While
Open J107 at C While
Open J107 at D While
running
runmng
runmng
running
runnmg
runmng
running
runmng
runmng
runmng
running
running
m Group 1 Sensor mode
m Group 1 Sensor mode
tn Normal Sensor mode
tn Normal Sensor mode
m Group 1 Sensor mode
m Group 1 Sensor mode
m Group 1 Sensor mode
in Group 1 Sensor mode
_n Normal Sensor mode
_n Normal Sensor mode
Jn Normal Sensor mode
m Normal Sensor mode
Controller responses to the above fault insertion test were correct and as expected.
The flight-type flow sensor was removed to perform a manual input filter test for Q1A2.
This manual test verified the low pass filter has a roll-off frequency of 127 + 32Hz. In
addition, data from the ATES functional test of 11 June 1992 was compared with the
pre/post environment ATES functional test. Results are below:
6/11/92(ATES #1) 8/26/93 (ATES #2) 8/28/93 (ATES #2)
Q1A1 filter Roll-off
Q1A2 filter Roll-off
131 Hz 120 Hz 122 Hz
127 Hz 122 Hz 126 Hz
With the flight-type flow sensor re-connected to F42 the thermal chamber was ramped
to -45oc. All temperature ramps were performed in the Group 1 Sensor (GR1S)
checkout mode. This allowed virtually uninterrupted monitoring of the 500 Hz test
signal (J107 A wrt B, J107 C wrt D) with the digital oscilloscope set to trigger on any
changes. No voltages were seen to have been generated by the controller on the
Q1A1 or Q1A2 inputs on the flight type flow.sensor. F42 was powered-off for a four
hour cold dwell. A cold start was then initiated and the Controller completed the first
thermal cycle without incident. This concluded testing with the flight-type sensor.
All three axes of vibration were performed with a profile of 10 minutes at -3dB (GR1S),
3 minutes at 0dB (Environmental Command Sequence(ECS)) and 10 minutes at -3dB
(7 minutes in GR1S, 3 minutes in ECS). The 500 Hz was again continuously
monitored at the Controller checkout console (CCC) test point panel (J107 A wrt B,
J107 C wrt D). F42 completed the 69 minutes of vibration without incident. (Note: The
OdB vibration level is the normal controller acceptance test level vibrat" ,1
environment.)
F42 was returned to thermal chamber and successfully completed the second (high
voltage) and third (high voltage) cycles with the Oscilloscope monitoring the CCC test
point panel as before. The GR1S mode was again commanded during all temperature
ramps to provide additional exposure to any flow signal channel failure mode. No
anomalies of the 500 Hz were detected by the oscilloscope.
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A post environmental ATES run was completed on 28 August 1993. Flow-signal
channel data was compared with a previous ATES run on 11 June 1992 (see Table I).
No significant shifts were observed.
In summary, F42 passed all phases of health check. Worst case analysis and special
testing with the flight-type sensors verified the integrity and isolation of the Q1A2 flow
signal channel. F42 was shipped to Stennis Space Center on 2 September 1993.
Prepared by N. Bier
M. Kert
Program Manager
Space Shuttle Main Engine Controller
Contracts Specialist
Space Shuttle Main Engine Controller
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TABLE I
F42 ATES Flow Channel Data
MODULE 5.14 - IE Flow Signal Channel Test
12Hz/.15V Q1 A1
12Hz/.15V Q1 B1
12Hz/.15V Q1 A2
12Hz/.15V Q1 B2
340Hz/13V Q1 A1
340Hz/13V Q1 B1
340Hz/13V Q1 A2
340Hz/13V Q1 B2
4Hz/1V QIA1
4Hz/1V Q1 B1
4Hz/1V Q1 A2
J 4Hz/1V QIB2
11-Jun-92
6c83
6c7e
6c85
6c7b
03d4
03d4
03d4
03d5
ffff
0000
0000
ffff
26-Aug-93
6c84
6C83
6C88
6C84
03d5
03d5
03d4
03d4
0000
0000
ffff
28-Aug-93
6C82
6c7d
6c83
6c7e
03d4
03d4
03d4
03d4
oooo
ffff
0000
LOW LIMIT
6ab5
6ab5
6ab5
6ab5
03d2
03d2
03d2
03d2
0000
0000
0000
0000 0000 0000
HIGH LIMIT
6e17
6e17
6e17
6e17
03d6
03d6
03d6
03d6
lmmm
IIII
ffff
mtmm
IIII
mPrm
llll
MODULE 515 - IE Flow Input Independance Test at 12 Hz
QIA1 with Q1 B1
Q1 A1 with Q1 A2
Q1A1 with Q1 B2
Q1 B1 with Q1 A1
Q1 B1 with QIA2
QIB1 with Q1 B2
QIA2 with Q1 A1
QIA2 with Q1 B1
11-Jun-92 26-Aug-93 28-Aug-93 LOW LIMIT HIGH LIMIT
029B 029A 029B 0292 02A2
029B 029A 029B 0292 02A2
029B 029B 029A 0292 02A2
029A 029A 029B
029A029A 029A
029A 029A 029A
029A 029B 029B
029B 029A
0292
0292
0292
0292
029B 0292
02A2
02A2
02A2
02A2
02A2
Q1 A2 with Q1 B2 029B 029A 029A
Q1 B2 with QIA1 029A 029A 029B
Q1 B2 with QIA2 029B 029B 029A
Q1 B2 with Q1 B1 029B 029B 029B
0292 02A2
0292 02A2
0292 02A2
0292 02A2
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Internal Letter
Date: 30-August-1993
TO:
Subject: .
{N_ne, Organization, InterneJAddn_s)
G.H. Skopp & J.L. Pennock
Depts. 709 & 477
Canoga-Rocketdyne
STS-51 Abort Team Action Item #30
Rockwell International
NO:. 93-PS-107-112
FROM: (Name, Organization, IntemJ/ Addreu. Phone)
P.J. Brzeski
• Dept. 107 - AC58
• Canoga-Rocketdyne
586-6642
The STS-51 abort on 12 August 1993 was caused when the channel A fuel flow sensor on
Engine 2033 failed the fuel flow intra-channel (A versus B) qualification limit check. During the
initial investigation it was wrongly assumed that fuel flow sensor #1 as listed in the ACTS
database was the channel A sensor. Paperwork listing the serial number of the #1 sensor as
the failed unit was prepared in order to expedite the failure analysis. When the channel A
sensor arrived at the vendor (Rosemount) the wrong serial number was on the Rocketdyne
paperwork. In actuality the #1 sensor is channel B and the #2 sensor is channel A. The #3
sensor is not used during flight but is installed on the engine.
The three fuel flow sensors are currently listed in the ACTS database as follows:
Fuel flow pickup #1 (LRU code J601)
Fuel flow pickup #2 (LRU code J602)
Fuel flow pickup #3 (LRU code J603)
It is requested that the part names be changed in the ACTS database to more accurately
reflect the sensor channel postions as called out in the Main Engine Controller logic. The LRU
codes will not change.
from: Fuel flow pickup #1
from: Fuel flow pickup #2
from: Fuel flow pickup #3
to: Fuel flow sensor CH B
to: Fuel flow sensor CH A
to: Fuel flow sensor NFD
Even though the MCC Pc sensors #1 and #2 are channels A and B, respectively, in order to
maintain consistency the part names should be changed as follows:
from: Main chamber press sensor #1 to: Main chamber press sensor CH A
from: Main chamber press sensor #2 to: Main chamber press sensor CH B
As with the fuel flow sensors, the LRU codes will not change. The channel A sensor
LRUs are J201 or J231 and the channel B sensor LRUs are J202 or J232.
SSME Flight Support Team
CC:
J. Rivetti (AB08)
A. Hill (PA07)
G. Gilmartin (AB32)
P. Seitz (AC58)
B. Wood (AC04)
K. Kan (AC58)
D. Hausman (AC58)
STS-51 Abort Team Files (AC58)
Form 131-R(CG) New 12-92
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